Conversely, otherness can also be positively valued. Recent writings about American Indians or definitions of Afrocentricity often romanticize minority and Third World cultures as possessing a less aggressive attitude toward nature and a more group-oriented attitude toward social life. Yet these assertions still embody a depressingly familiar set of beliefs: The other lacks the rationality of modern man, or the other's thought process is circular rather than linear. These images of the other are turned not so much on their head as on their side. Assigning positive values to the other may be novel, but the racial and ethnic stereotypes used to arrive at these conclusions are shockingly familiar.
The image of the other is derived not only from assertions about cultural differences. The use of a ballet pose to portray the Reagans and the African witch doctor was probably not consciously intended; neither was it accidental. Negative images need positive associations to make them work. If familiar devices were not used, the consumers of the image would have nothing onto which to graft cultural, racial, or ethnic differences. The politics of producing the image of the other requires a poetics of difference andsimilarity. The familiar becomes the bridge through which we understand the exotic.
While all museum exhibits draw on the resources of public culture and popular imagery to produce their effects, none draw on them more than exhibitions of the art and life of the other. And exhibits of exotic art and cultures are as much an arena of discourse about the other as editorial cartoons or travel books. However, because they draw on the authority of museums and the public's goodwill toward museums, exhibitions have a greater legitimacy than forms of popular culture defined as less highbrow. But all forms of communicating about the other use the organizing principles of difference and similarity to produce their imagery.' Which of these opposing principles dominates an exhibition's account or image of a cultural other often determines how the other is perceived. Although recent scholarship describes the other as being represented primarily through difference, similarity can be-and often is-used to assert that the people of other cultures are no different in principle than the producers and consumers of their images. Striking differences can then be interpreted as mere surfice manifestations of underlying si~nilarities.~ Exoticizing often works by inverting the familiar-showing how a well-known practice takes an inverted form among other peoples. The common belief that Africans practice animism is an example. The anthropomorphic tendency of most Western religious belief is inverted, thus creating the notion that there is a class of people who worship beings created not in their own image, but in the image of nature. That such beliefs have never been documented in a non-Western religion has not stopped legions of writers from describing Africans as animists.
Assimilating strategies are less easy to read. They appeal to the audience's sense of the familiar and natural. They don't stop exhibit goers in their tracks with such thoughts as "What in the world is that?" Assimilating is inherently a more subtle I exhibiting strategy than exoticizing. In the donated them than about their maker, their iconography, or their history.4 The governing assumptions behind these displays are that primitive objects mysteriously embody the same aesthetics as modern art forms and that curators and museum audiences are able to appreciate such objects because they are the heirs to a h i l i a r aesthetic tradition whose history I encompasses the primitives who make primitive art. What they truly inherit is a capitalist world system that has acquired things from other peoples and transformed them into objects of modern art.
The mntroversial L 984 MOMA exhibition " 'Primitivism' in 20th Century
Art" provides us with a classic example of the assimilating strategy. Objects were brought together either because they were known to provide models for modern artists or because they were known to exhibit perceived affinities. For William Rubin, the curator of the exhibition, affinities exist because artists working independently on similar formal problems arrive at similar solutions. This is a pure structuralist interpretation. Considerations of content, such as iconography, or questions about intention and purpose, such as the religious role of an object, or even the examination of the contexts of production and use are omitted as possible factors that influence the final form of the object. History is omitted from consideration. Objects are defined as the products of individuals who accidentally derive their work from a limited stock of available forms. The result is assimilating because cultural and historical differences are obliterated from the exhibiting record. Rubin's exhibit turns the African, American Indian, and Pacific makers of the objects displayed in his exhibition into modern artists who lack only the individual identity and history of modern art.5 Given the curator's insistence that context is absolutely irrelevant to the exhibition of affinities between the primitive and the modern, the only place in history allowed for the artists of other cultures and their works is as a footnote to the development of art in the West.
Even Rubin's decision to retain the word primitivism stirs controversy. The sense that so-called primitives are what we once were, our "contemporary ancestors" whose only history is our past, can hardly be avoided. The author Anthony Burgess defines primitivism as the "sense of a stumbling amateur striving towards a hard-won perfection and not quite achieving it." No matter how Rubin chooses to define his terms, his methods of dassification reveal the sense conveyed by Burgess's definiti~n.~ Yet Rubin's intention is not to exclude primitive artists from the history of art. He simply desires to place primitive aesthetics on a par with modernist aesthetics. In the end, however, he merely assimilates the aesthetics of other cultural traditions into a particular moment within his own tradition.
Other aesthetic traditions take shape in cultural settings outside of such art museums as MOMA. There are, for example, aesthetics that use political or religious criteria in judgments about what is good and bad. In some aesthetic traditions, the experience of viewing an object may be more than just a sensory reaction to the visual, just as aesthetic idioms may be applied to objects and actions normally excluded from the realm of museums.
If Rubin had chosen to examine how "tribal" artists and Picasso used similar forms in combination with other forms, or if he had inquired about how these objects were judged by their users and makers in the context of their creation, he would have produced a more textured and culturally diverse exhibition, while still remaining faithful to his project. ' The Pompidou Center's answer to MOMA's "Primitivism" exhibition, the 1989 "Magiciens de la Terre" consisted of two entire halls of artworks derived from vastly different cultural traditions, yet the master narrative for the whole exhibition asserted a fundamental underlying similarity in spirit and intent among the producers of such disparate works of am8 In this sense, the curators of "Magiciens de la Terre" did no better than the curator of "Primitivism." By juxtaposing a work by Richard Long with a sand drawing by Australian aboriginal artists (figs. 3, 4), the curators conflated Long's attempt to return to the elemental with the Australian re-creation of an alternative universe-the "dream time" in which the cultural world was wrested from nature. Given the audience's lack of familiarity with Australian cosmology and art, the act of conflation becomes an act of assimilation: the Australian artists become echoes of Long. As Yogi Berra once said, "It's dkjh vu all over again." There is, in effect, no substantial difference between the "Magiciens" exhibition's juxtaposition of Long's work with the Australian aborigines' sand drawing and the "Primitivism" show's juxtaposition of Kenneth Noland's Circle painting with a New Guinea shield exhibiting concentric motifs ( fig. 5) .' Nevertheless, the curators of "Magiciens" could be seen as more egalitarian than the curator of "Primitivism." They deny that Third World artists and contemporary artists differ in self-consciousness. All, in their view, are equally conscious about the sources and meanings of the art they create; perhaps it would be fairer to say that all are equally naive about the magical and elemental sources of their art. The cost of this egalitarian strategy of assimilation, however, is the elimination of cultural context, motives, and resources from the record.
All exhibitions, in fact all representations of the other, simultaneously exoticize and assimilate, but some museums often emphasize both exhibiting devices within the same setting. The history of the Smithsonian Institution illustrates this in a grand manner. The National Museum of American History was originally developed out of the National Museum, which was a museum of natural history. Unintentionally but nevertheless palpably, the Smithsonian maintains a nineteenthcentury evolutionist distinction between modern cultures and those cultures that are best known and exhibited as part of nature. The latter, primarily American Indians and peoples of the Third World, are then subject to the interpretations and procedures of natural history scholars. In contrast, white middle-class Americans are defined as possessing science and technology and as having cultural and social history exempting them from a similar examination in terms of natural history.''
No genre of museum has been able to escape the problems of exoticizing and assimilating inherent in exhibiting other cultures. That includes museums that restrict themselves to examining diversity within their own societies. The same museums that make the products of The solution will not be to invent new tropes of representation or new exhibiting devices for museum displays. Every venture into the unknown is based on an analogy with the known. Exoticizing and assimilating are all we have to reach out to the unknown. At best, they enable us to approximate other experiences and to appreciate new forms of art; at worst, they prevent us from truly learning about other cultures and their works of art. The error is not in using these strategies, but in failing to reflect on our own work when making analogies with the other and in treating our works as if they were naturally occurring-as if they did not also carry the unacknowledged baggage of other associations.
